Good question.

In response, I suppose I would challenge the idea that there really are “wildly conflicting intuitions people have had historically, and across cultures” that cannot be explained by appeal to morally relevant circumstantial facts (e.g., the dependence condition pointed out in my post).

Further, in direct opposition to Unger, I would say that presumption is on the side of reliability. And so the burden must fall on the one urging that moral intuitions are not reliable to suggest a counterexample.

Best,

Jim

Typically, in everyday conversation, if we morally evaluate an act, we tend to assign it to one of four categories (although the last is often only implicit):
a) Wrong/Blameworthy (e.g. torturing small child)
b) Permissible/Non-moral (e.g. drinking tea ra

Do you think that their point can be better demonstrated by the wildly conflicting intuitions people have had historically, and across cultures? Wouldn’t the difference there show that if moral argument is to proceed at all, intuition is a bad way to do it, since what it tells us is bound to be incredibly culturally and temporally contingent?

(and, following from that, the counter-intuitiveness of utilitarianism is irrelevant since any theory is bound to be counter-intuitive to /some/ large group of people)

Thanks,
Alex